Drini Imami is a Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Agribusiness, Agricultural University of Tirana. He spoke with William Foley about the protests sweeping Albania over a Kushner-linked luxury resort development on Sazan, an island off the country's Adriatic coast. The proposed development has spurred massive opposition, in part because it threatens a coastal wildlife reserve. But the protests also reflect deeper anger at corruption and the cost of living.
This interview has been edited for clarity and length.
William Foley: Can you give us some background on the Kushner project and what it means for the area?
Drini Imami: This area is very unique in terms of wildlife. Civil society actors have made it clear that any such development would threaten that. Sazan is our only real island. During communism it was a closed military fortress — impossible to visit. I had the chance to go a few years ago and it is something people can access, even if it is not well maintained. The fear now is that it will become exclusively the domain of wealthy visitors, inaccessible to ordinary Albanians.
That concern extends beyond Sazan to beaches more broadly, which were freely accessible when I was a student and are now being monopolised through various schemes. So the island question touches something quite visceral. But my main concern, and I believe the main concern for most Albanians, remains the overall level of corruption in governance.
In my view, most Albanians are not against American investors or Mr. Kushner, specifically — Albanians are generally very pro-American, for historical reasons. Given this context, the expectation may have been that the involvement of Mr. Kushner would make the project more attractive to the local population while also potentially contributing to good relations between the Albanian government and the US administration.
But what is clear is that there is complete lack of transparency, and this occurs in a context of high corruption. It is also widely known that large amounts of money from the grey economy — namely, drug-related activities — are being recycled, particularly into the construction sector. That is common knowledge and is well documented. It explains to some extent the extraordinary pace of construction, both along the coast and in the capital, where we have tens of thousands of empty apartments while building continues to accelerate. Part of that is driven by money laundering.
So this reaction to the Kushner project does not reflect opposition to this specific project alone, but a broader and deep distrust of the government and of whatever is associated with it.
William Foley: You have described this as more than a reaction to one development project. Is that right?
Drini Imami: Yes. The Kushner project was the tipping point, but the real driver — based on my conversations with friends and colleagues, though I haven't done formal research — is a huge accumulation of frustration. Albania ranks among the most corrupt countries in Europe according to the Corruption Perception Index, and citizens don't need the studies to know it. They face corruption on a daily basis. Whether it's obtaining certain medicines for a sick family member, navigating the inspectorate if you run a business, or dealing with the arrogance that characterises so many public institutions — it permeates life. This arrogance and corruption is not just at the highest level of government; it characterises the system at large. And that is the main reason, in my view, why people are going out on the streets.
Another dimension is that the public sector employs a large share of the population, and many of those employees are afraid to express dissent openly — afraid of losing their jobs, or of their spouse or partner losing their job. So not everyone who is dissatisfied takes to the streets. Students are different: they are not embedded in this patronage-based system. They are more idealistic, less captured, and historically they are always the most energetic force in such moments.
William Foley: How does corruption manifest on an everyday basis for ordinary Albanians?
Drini Imami: It depends on personal circumstances. The health sector is one clear area. In the construction sector it is also obvious. We see a high concentration of economic activity in the hands of a few oligarchs, which produces higher prices across the board. Even if not everyone pays a bribe every day, we all end up paying higher prices for goods and services partially because of the oligarchic structures behind them. If you look at Albanian supermarkets, the same branded product can cost twice what it does elsewhere — partly due to economies of scale and differences in taxation but also partly due to lack of competition, which is itself driven by clientelism and corrupt governance.
Look at housing in Tirana. It is now nearly impossible for a middle-income family to buy a decent apartment. Prices have doubled or tripled in a few years. Show me another European capital where that has happened. Post-COVID saw steep increases everywhere, yes, but not doubling or tripling, as far as I know. That is largely driven by money from drug trafficking and corruption, combined with a supply side concentrated in very few hands.
William Foley: In your work, you seem sceptical of the idea that corruption is natural or inevitable in countries like Albania. What are its political and economic roots?
Drini Imami: It is a very complex debate — to what extent corruption is endemic and to what extent it is shaped by institutional design. But there is clear evidence that the quality of institutions and rules deeply influences levels of corruption. A telling example: most Albanians who emigrate to Western countries comply very well with rules and tend not to engage in corrupt behaviour, because the incentive structures — the sticks and carrots — are in place. So I do not believe that Albanians are inherently more corrupt than others.
What I do believe is that our economic and political elite has, through their policies — intentionally or not — constructed a system characterised by distortions: less economic competition, and a politicised public life in which these things are deeply interconnected. Through this system they have empowered themselves. Corruption can be significantly reduced through institutional reform. The problem is that those in power have little incentive to implement it.
William Foley: How does the post-communist transition connect to the problems Albania faces today?
Drini Imami: The transition followed what was called shock therapy — many factories were closed or even destroyed, creating a catastrophic economic situation with no jobs and massive emigration. But the deeper problem was institutional. Under the pretext of dismantling communism, institutions were not reformed but destroyed and rebuilt from scratch, often very badly. One famous example: new judges were trained in a matter of months. You can imagine what kind of judicial system you get from that. The justice sector became heavily corrupt, which is why Albania subsequently underwent a unique vetting and reform process for the judiciary.
When you destroy institutions and pretend to start from zero, you create a vacuum — and that is ideal breeding ground for corruption. The shock therapy did not only destroy economic assets; more importantly, it impaired the institutional fabric of society. And that legacy is still with us.
William Foley: The writer Vincent Bevins, argued that the mass protest movements of the 2010s often had spectacular short-term effects but in the long run delivered little — or even the opposite of what protesters wanted. Do you think this movement will produce meaningful political change, or will the bulldozers simply return once the cameras are off?
Drini Imami: We have our own experience to draw on. In 1997, protests following the collapse of pyramid schemes descended into complete chaos and a state of emergency in which thousands were killed. I don't see that risk now. We are at a different stage, we have learned from that history, we are a NATO member surrounded by the EU, and there have been no violent incidents in the current protests — which speaks to a real civic maturity. So I don't see a risk of degeneration into chaos or civil conflict.
But of course, if these protests fail to deliver major political change, people will be disappointed and the same actors will continue as before. That risk is real, and it is a responsibility for all of us to do our part to reduce it. There will certainly be attempts by various external actors to have a stake and try to influence how things unfold. But I see a strong determination among the young generation and civil society. The challenge over the coming months will be to transform that energy into a political movement and a platform with which people can exercise real electoral choice. That is still uncertain. But I am optimistic. Being surrounded by, and having the support of, the EU and the diaspora, the chances are real that this leads to genuine political change in Albania.
During the past three decades Albanian politics has been dominated by two parties led by two strongmen — Mr. Berisha and Mr. Rama — and they both bear primary responsibility for the current state of affairs. It is simply not sustainable to have political leaders stay in place for twenty or thirty years. Whether the existing parties are reformed from within, or new parties emerge from this movement, remains to be seen. Both can happen, and both should happen.
Drini Imami is a Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Agribusiness, Agricultural University of Tirana.
William Foley is a research fellow at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, and an editor at An Clogán.